Gaussian Post-selection for Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography by Walk, Nathan et al.
Gaussian Post-selection for Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography
Nathan Walk∗ and Timothy C. Ralph
Centre for Quantum Computation and Communication Technology
School of Mathematics and Physics, University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland 4072, Australia
Thomas Symul and Ping Koy Lam
Centre for Quantum Computation and Communication Technology
Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, ACT 0200, Australia
(Dated: October 30, 2018)
We extend the security proof for continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols using post
selection to account for arbitrary eavesdropping attacks by employing the concept of an equivalent
protocol where the post-selection is implemented as a series of quantum operations including a
virtual distillation. We introduce a particular ‘Gaussian’ post selection and demonstrate that the
security can be calculated using only experimentally accessible quantities. Finally we explicitly
evaluate the performance for the case of a noisy Gaussian channel in the limit of unbounded key
length and find improvements over all pre-existing continuous variable protocols in realistic regimes.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the process of gen-
erating a common random key between two parties us-
ing a quantum communications protocol. The power of
this method is that the security of the key distribution,
and the subsequent communication via a one time pad,
is established while making no assumptions about the
technological capabilities of a eavesdropper. This proce-
dure also has the distinction of being the most developed
quantum information technology [1].
There are two main flavours of QKD, discrete variable
(DV) and continuous variable (CV) which are realised
by encoding and then detecting: single photons [2] or
the quadrature variables of the optical field [3] respec-
tively. The latter kind, which we shall consider here, has
the advantage of higher raw bit rates due to the high ef-
ficiency and high bandwidth of homodyne detection and
ease of integration with existing communications infras-
tructure. CV protocols that employ post-selection [4] -
a classical filtering of the measurement results - enjoy
additional advantages in terms of versatility and recon-
ciliation efficiency.
Asymptotic (in the sense of string length) uncondi-
tional security for protocols that do not employ post-
selection is achieved by first noting the equivalence of
an experimentally implemented prepare and measure
(P&M) scheme to an entanglement based (EB) version
[5], followed by the result that for collective attacks secu-
rity may be bounded from below by assuming the entan-
gled state at the end of the protocol is Gaussian[6, 7] and
finally a proof that collective attacks are asymptotically
optimal [8]. However for protocols using post-selection
(PS) this analysis cannot be straightforwardly applied as
an equivalent entanglement based picture has yet to be
constructed, with security only shown under the assump-
tion of a Gaussian eavesdropping attack [9].
Here we fill this gap and hence demonstrate uncondi-
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tional security for post-selected CVQKD following the
proof method used in [7]. In particular we construct
an EB scheme in which the post-selection is replaced
by equivalent heralded state transformations. We show
we are able to straightforwardly construct the necessary
parameters of this EB scheme from experimental data
providing a realistically obtainable bound for the case
of collective attacks and hence asymptotically uncondi-
tional security.
Security of CVQKD.—In general one equates each pro-
tocol in which: the sender (Alice) prepares an ensemble
of quantum states based upon a classical random prob-
ability distribution and sends it through the domain of
the eavesdropper (Eve) to the recipient (Bob), to an en-
tanglement based scheme in which: Alice prepares an
entangled state one half of which is kept and used for
a projective measurement; and the other is transmitted
to Bob again through Eves domain. The proper choice
of the initial entangled state and the projective measure-
ment by Alice allows us to rigorously express any prepare
and measure schemes [5].
Bob makes a quadrature measurement upon his re-
ceived states and then Alice and Bob engage in a recon-
ciliation procedure to correct the errors in their shared
classical string. The secret key rate for the entire proto-
col is then given by
K = βI(a : b)− I(E : X), X ∈ {a, b} (1)
where I(a : b) is the Shannon mutual information be-
tween classical strings belonging to Alice and Bob at the
end of the protocol, β is the efficiency of their reconcil-
iation procedure and I(E : X) is the quantum mutual
information between either Eve and Bob if considering
reverse reconciliation protocols or Eve and Alice if con-
sidering direct reconciliation.
Eve’s mutual information is given by the purification
of the entangled state before and after Alice or Bob’s
measurement. For example the direct reconciliation ex-
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2pression is [6, 7]
I(E : A) = S(ρE)− S(ρE |a) = S(ρAB)− S(ρB |a) (2)
with the von Neumann entropy given by S(ρ) =
tr(ρ log ρ) and for the second equality we have used the
fact that the overall tripartite state |ABE〉 is pure. This
quantity is not easy to calculate in general but it has
been shown that we may bound the expression from be-
low by analysing a Gaussian [6, 7], symmetric [10] state
with the same first and second moments. For Gaussian
states, the von Neumann entropy is obtained straightfor-
wardly and thus the security of the entire protocol can
be characterised entirely by the covariance matrix of the
entangled state shared by Alice and Bob.
Equivalent post-selection scheme.—While reverse rec-
onciliation can be shown to to be secure for arbitrary
losses in the absence of noise, for any non-zero amount of
excess noise the secure distance is inevitably finite. One
could attempt to address this by increasing the input sig-
nal modulation however any imperfection in the reconcil-
iation process (β < 1) means optimising the modulation
can also only lead to a finite improvement. On the other
hand direct reconciliation is significantly more tolerant
to excess noise but only successful when the channel loss
is below 50% or 3 dB.
All of these detrimental effects can be improved us-
ing post-selection [4], a technique in which values in the
space of Bob’s possible quadrature measurement results
and Alice’s quadrature encoding are probabilistically re-
weighted and only these new distributions are kept to
form the key. Intuitively one would expect this strategy
to yield an advantage as the eavesdropper is effectively
shut out of Alice and Bob’s post-measurement collabo-
ration. This improved performance comes at the price of
not being able to directly apply Eq. (2) as this would
not allow for Eve’s knowledge of Alice and Bob’s post-
selection. This can be accounted for as long as one can
keep track of the way post-selection by one party influ-
ences the state of the other in the equivalent EB scheme
which we shall now demonstrate.
In general one post selects by applying a weighting
function to achieve a new probability distribution in the
chosen measurement basis, p(x)
PS−−→ w(x)p(x) = p′(x).
The normalisation of p′(x) gives the amount of data re-
tained while transitioning from the initial to the post-
selected ensemble. Alternatively one could apply an
appropriate transformation consisting of a unitary act-
ing on the mode in question together with auxiliary
mode(s) which are subsequently traced out. A use-
ful post-selection will correspond in the EB scheme to
achieving some amount of distillation of the virtual en-
tanglement, inevitably along with some additional noise.
In this setting, Fig.1, the probabilistic nature of the post
selection corresponds to Bob’s first operation UPS being
a non-deterministic but heralded operation (the distilla-
tion) followed by appropriate deterministic unitary in-
teractions corresponding to the noise addition and Bob’s
final measurement.
FIG. 1: Equivalent entanglement based version of a post-
selected protocol. Alice distributes one arm of an entangled
state through Eve’s domain to Bob and makes a projective
measurement UA (giving classic output a) corresponding to
an ensemble of states sent in a prepare and measure scheme.
Bob passes his arm first through a device that probabilis-
tically distills entanglement, UPS , and then makes a poten-
tially noisy measurement UB giving classical output bPS . The
heralding signal of UPS (h) is given to Eve but the remaining
ancillae are kept within the stations of Alice and Bob.
In this picture Eve’s additional knowledge of the form
of Alice and Bob’s post selection is reflected by the state
ρAB in Eq.(2) being identified with the state conditioned
on successful heralding of Bob’s first operation, i.e. the
state after UPS but before UB . After all ancillae are
traced over the outputs of UA and UB give classical
strings a and bPS which exactly match the experimen-
tal results for the post selected ensemble. Note that we
will be considering the secure station scenario where the
ancillae remaining within the laboratories of Alice and
Bob will not be attributed to the eavesdropper.
The worst case scenario would correspond to the final
state being Gaussian [6, 7] so if one is able to uniquely
identify a Gaussian collection of unitaries and ancillae
that result in the same measurement statistics then the
key rate of that state will be provide a lower bound for
the post-selected protocol. Denoting a successful run of
the distillation as the outcome s and the resultant state
ρPS =
(UsPS)
†ρABUsPS
tr[(UsPS)
†ρABUsPS ]
one may write,
IPS(A : E) = S(ρPS)− S(ρPS |a)
≤ S(ρGPS)− S(ρGPS |a), (3)
where ρGPS is a Gaussian state with the same covariance
matrix. This method is applicable to any form of post-
selection, however demonstrating that the covariance ma-
trix of the equivalent Gaussian setup can be obtained
from measured data is non-trivial and may be more or
less experimentally demanding (in terms of the number
of measurements) depending upon the particular form of
the post-selection.
Gaussian post-selection.— We shall consider a partic-
ular P&M scheme, Fig. 2 panel a), in which Alice draws
values (xA, pA) from a bivariate Gaussian of 0 mean and
variance VA and uses these numbers to modulate the vac-
uum to create an ensemble of coherent states of the form
|xA + ipA〉 which she sends to Bob through a quantum
channel. Bob uses homodyne detection on his received
states, randomly switching between quadratures given
3FIG. 2: Prepare and measure and entanglement based ver-
sions of a protocol using Gaussian post-selection. a) P&M
scheme: Alice uses two classical Gaussian strings (xA, pA) to
prepare and transmit an ensemble of coherent states to Bob
who homodyne detects and then applies a Gaussian weight-
ing function. b) Equivalent EB scheme: Alice distributes one
arm of an EPR pair and makes a heterodyne measurement ob-
taining measurement results directly proportional to (xA, pA).
Bob first passes his arm through an NLA, classically amplifies
via a vacuum seeded two-mode squeezer (TMS) then mixes
his mode with one arm of another entangled pair (EPRB) on
a beamsplitter. He finally homodyne detects and obtains ex-
actly the measurement results from the P&M scheme. The
heralding signal of the NLA is given to Eve but the unmea-
sured ancillae are kept within Bob’s station.
by xˆ = aˆ + aˆ† and pˆ = i(aˆ† − aˆ) where we have nor-
malised the vacuum noise to unity. Bob then filters his
results with the goal of selecting an ensemble which is
a Gaussian distribution with a certain target variance
VPS . For the most common case of a Gaussian channel
Bob’s input distribution is another Gaussian of variance
VB and the appropriate weighting function would look
like w(x) =
√
VB/VPS exp(−x2(1/VPS − 1/VB)). In the
relevant case VPS > VB this function is convex so in
order to arrive at a proper probability distribution we
will choose some endpoints ±∆, renormalise the func-
tion to the value at this point and set all values outside
this range to unity. For a Gaussian input state the exact
filter function is
W (x) = N
(
1 +
(
w(x)
w(∆)
− 1
)
(Θ(x+ ∆)−Θ(x−∆))
)
(4)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function and the frac-
tion of data kept is the re-normalisation N . When ∆
is 0 this operation is the identity. As ∆ → ∞ it re-
sults in a Gaussian distribution of variance VPS and in
between give a slightly non-Gaussian state with variance
VB < V < VPS . Finally Alice and Bob publicly announce
a subset of their data to characterise the covariance ma-
trix on both the initial and post-selected ensemble and, if
secure, engage in reconciliation and privacy amplification
to distill a completely secure key. Notice that although
the weight function is smooth instead of hard edged it is
determined entirely by Bob and the only information he
sends to Alice is a ‘keep or reject’ signal.
The equivalent entanglement based scheme, Fig. 2
panel b), involves Alice preparing a two-mode squeezed
vacuum or EPR state, one mode of which she keeps
and measures, the other being transmitted to Bob.
Alice’s makes a heterodyne detection whereas Bob’s
measurement, depending upon the target variance, de-
composes into a combination of a noiseless amplifica-
tion/distillation followed by classical amplification and
finally some additional noise. The necessary Gaussian en-
tanglement distillation is achieved via the noiseless linear
amplifier (NLA) [11, 12] with the classical amplifier and
additional noise corresponding to a two-mode squeezer
with vacuum ancilla and a beamsplitter with an EPR
pair ancilla respectively. If we can uniquely characterise
Gaussian operations that perform the necessary trans-
formations from the transmitted to the post-selected en-
semble at the level of the covariance matrix then we can
apply the above proof and determine the security.
To illustrate this method we evaluate performance for
the most common case, the noisy Gaussian channel. Such
a channel is completely parameterised by it’s transmis-
sion T and excess thermal noise ξ [13]. One can calculate
the action of an NLA on an EPR state sent through a
general Gaussian channel [14, 15] with the result being
an effective protocol where stronger entanglement was
distributed through a channel with less loss but greater
excess noise, leading to an overall advantage. Inverting
the relationship for the effective entanglement generated
gives a relationship,
g = 1 +
2(V PSA − VA)
T (VA(2 + V PSA − ξ) + V PSA ξ)
(5)
that uniquely identifies the gain of the NLA based only
upon the measured channel parameters and Alice’s mod-
ulation variance before and after after post-selection.
Bob and Alice’s other operations are just beamsplitters
and two-mode squeezing, their effect on the covariance
matrix being given by the appropriate symplectic trans-
formations [16]. Given Alice and Bob’s measurement of
the covariance matrix before and after the post-selection
straightforward algebra allows us to characterise all pa-
rameters in Fig.2 and thus unconditionally bound Eve’s
information via Eq.(3). For this form of post-selection,
the resultant distributions turn out to be extremely close
to Gaussian, so we have the option of making use of re-
cent improvements in the reconciliation efficiency Gaus-
sian variables [17] as well as the sign encoding of [4] and
we will choose the former case here. See [14] for a de-
tailed calculation of these quantities and the secret key
rate. The crucial tradeoff in this scheme is between a
large post-selection to improve the effective channel and
the proportion of measurement results that are discarded.
We plot the key rate as a function of distance of a
coherent state homodyne protocol, Fig.3, for both di-
rect and reverse reconciliation along with the case with-
out post-selection for comparison. In all plots the rec-
onciliation efficiency is taken to be a constant value of
β = 0.9 and for each point Alice’s modulation variance is
independently optimised for each protocol along with the
4FIG. 3: Improvement in secret key rates due to Gaussian
post-selection. a) Direct reconciliation with post-selection
(solid lines) and without (dashed lines) as a function of loss for
ξ = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} with decreasing key rate. b) Reverse recon-
ciliation with post-selection (solid lines) and without (dashed
lines) as a function of loss for ξ = {0.02, 0.03, 0.05} with de-
creasing key rate. For all plots β = 0.9.
parameters (∆,VPS) for the post-selected scheme. Fur-
thermore for the case without post-selection we included
the potential to optimise over a deterministic addition of
noise as outlined in [18]. For these realistic experimental
parameters the post-selection protocol allows for secure
key generation over long distances (in combination with
RR) and for greater excess noise (in combination with
DR) than any previous coherent state protocol. Finally
the presence of an NLA in the effective Gaussian circuit
leads one to compare these results with those of [15]. We
find that almost all of the improvements shown there are
recovered by our classical post-processing scheme. This
leads one to conclude that an NLA placed just before
Bob’s detectors will not lead to a benefit for QKD over
and above that of a post-selection scheme.
Conclusions.—
In conclusion we have shown that post-selection based
CVQKD is secure for arbitrary collective attacks, and
thus asymptotically secure for all attacks. This was
achieved by identifying an entanglement based scheme
that correctly reflects the post-selected ensemble that is
used in the final key generation. Furthermore results for a
particular Gaussian form of post-selection show improve-
ments in performance over all previous coherent state
protocols for certain relevant combinations of loss and
noise. Avenues for further work, include the investiga-
tion of other post-selection filters with a view to proving
which is optimal, the incorporation of finite-size effects
and the combination of post-selection with other proto-
cols to identify the optimal technique for a given scenario.
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on virtual noiseless amplification in CVQKD [19].
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Appendix A: Parameter Estimation
A crucial step in all cryptographic schemes is the esti-
mation of parameters which form the basis for quantita-
tive analysis of security. A further complication is that
for many QKD protocols, including the scheme investi-
gated in this Letter, security is actually calculated on a
related entanglement based version. Thus it is important
to establish that the parameters measured in the exper-
imental implementation are sufficient to characterise the
appropriate entangled state.
From a purely theoretical point of view, an appropri-
ate entangled state would be any two-mode state such
that Alice’s projective measurement results in exactly the
same key-generating states as seen by Bob and Eve. This
means that for any given experiment there exist multiple
options for an equivalent entangled state. However some
are much more attractive than others for the purposes
of parameter estimation. Here we shall first go through
the procedure for estimating the necessary quantities us-
ing only experimentally accessible data for the canonical
Gaussian protocols and then show that a similar pro-
cedure exists for the scheme outlined in this letter. In
the all Gaussian CVQKD protocols the procedure is rel-
atively straightforward. One is interested in estimating
a covariance matrix (CM) of the form
γAB =
(
a I2 c σz
c σz b I2
)
(A1)
where I2 = [1, 0; 0, 1], σz = [1, 0; 0,−1]. The block form
is justified with the use of symmetry arguments as out-
lined in [10, 20] and thus one must only know 3 param-
eters. The experimentally available information consists
of 2 classical strings: the quadrature displacements of
the coherent states created by Alice and the quadrature
measurements made by Bob. From these one can com-
pute 2 variances and a covariance which will give us the
3 required parameters as shown below. In all following
discussion the vacuum noise is normalised to unity. The
canonical choice of entangled purification for the Gaus-
sian ensemble of coherent states sent by Alice is an EPR
pair [5] which has a covariance matrix of the form A1
with entries a = b = VA + 1 and c =
√
V 2A + 2VA where
VA is Alice’s modulation variance in the P&M scheme.
After transmission Alice and Bob will measure the CM
of the de-cohered EPR and interpreting these as corre-
sponding to an effective Gaussian channel paramaterised
by T and ξ can express the entries as a = VA + 1,
b = TVA + Tξ + 1 and c =
√
T (V 2A + 2VA).
Up to this point Alice and Bob follow exactly the
same procedure for our new protocol. Then, after they
apply the post-selection filter they repeat this process
to measure another CM, γPS , with entries given by
a = V PSA + 1, b = T
PSV PSA + T
PSξPS + 1 and c =√
TPS((V PSA )
2 + 2V PSA ). Note that although we write
down effective channel parameters the elements of the
CM are directly measured and not assumed to take some
form based upon the channel parameters.
We now wish to determine the Gaussian operations
within Bob’s station that will result in the same statis-
tics. These are an NLA gain g, a parametric amplifi-
cation parameter η and an EPR of variance NB injected
through a beamsplitter of transmission TB . Inverting the
expressions for the NLA derived below we can solve for
the gain to find,
g = 1 +
2(V PSA − VA)
T (VA(2 + V PSA − ξ) + V PSA ξ)
. (A2)
Substituting this gain into the transformations above we
deduce a third covariance matrix of the state after the
NLA, γNLA, with entries aNLA, bNLA, cNLA of the same
form as above . In general the Gaussian post-selection
does not only simulate an NLA but acts to further am-
plify the state and then add noise. Both these opera-
tions are equivalent to unitary interactions with ancillae
which are subsequently traced out. The amplification
corresponds to interacting the incoming mode with the
vacuum in a two-mode squeezer and the thermal noise is
equivalent to mixing the incoming mode with one arm
of an EPR pair on a beamsplitter. These operations
between these last two covariance matrices can thus be
compactly expressed via symplectic transformations,
γPS = BS
T (TB)S
T (η)γNLAS(η)BS (TB) (A3)
where
S(η) =
( √
η I2
√
η − 1 σz√
η − 1 σz √η I2
)
,
BS(T ) =
( √
T I2
√
1− T I2
−√1− T I2
√
T I2
)
(A4)
are the symplectic transformations for a two-mode
squeezer and a beamsplitter respectively. Substituting
γNLA and γPS leaves us with a matrix equation that can
be solved for TB , η and NB . The necessary relationships
are,
TB(NB + 1)−NB = bPS − c
2
PS
c2NLA
(1 + bNLA)
η =
c2PS
c2NLATB
(A5)
Strictly speaking there is a degeneracy between these pa-
rameters in that there are combinations of values the
three, however any combination consistent with the out-
put statistics result in the same secret key rate. Thus we
can construct all the necessary parameters to calculate
the secret key rate based only upon the directly mea-
sured elements of the covariance matrix before and after
post-selection.
6Appendix B: NLA: Application to CVQKD
As described above the ensemble that Alice sends to
Bob is equivalent to the preparation of an EPR pair of
variance V = VA+1 which in turn can be created by mix-
ing appropriately squeezed states on a 50:50 beamsplit-
ter. Furthermore transmission through a Gaussian chan-
nel of parameters T and ξ is also equivalent to interaction
on a beamsplitter of transmission T with a second EPR
created by Eve with variance given by NE =
1−T+Tξ
1−T .
Thus we can calculate the effect of on NLA on a CVQKD
system through a Gaussian channel by mixing two appro-
priate EPR pairs and then applying the NLA to Bob’s
mode.
The initial EPR states of Alice and Eve can be written
in the xˆ quadrature basis,
|AB〉 = 1√
2pi
∫
d2xi e
− 18
(xA−xB)2
VS e−
1
8 (xA+xB)
2VS |xA〉 |xB〉
|E1E2〉 = 1√
2pi
∫
d2xi e
− 18
(xE1
−xE2 )
2
Vξ e−
1
8 (xE1+xE2 )
2Vξ |xE2〉 |xE1〉
where the squeezing variances are related to the P&M
parameters by VS = e
acosh(VA+1) and Vξ = e
acosh(NE)
and in all integrals dxi to to be taken to run over all
mode variables present. These modes B and E1 are then
mixed on a beamsplitter of transmission T with one out-
put being sent to Bob and the other retained by Eve.
If we transform to the Hilbert space belonging to Alice
Bob and Eve at the end of the protocol the appropriate
change of variables allows us to write the final shared
state as,
|ABE〉 = 1
2pi
∫
d2xi ψ(xi) |xA〉 |xE2〉 |xE1〉 |xE2〉(B1)
where
ψ(xi) =
1
2pi
e
− (xA+
√
TxB+
√
1−Txe1 )
2
8VS
− 14VS
(
− xA√
2
+
√
TxB√
2
+
√
1−TxE1√
2
)
2− 116Vξ(−
√
2
√
1−TxB+
√
2
√
TxE1−
√
2xE2)
2− (−
√
2
√
1−TxB+
√
2
√
TxE1
+
√
2xE2)
2
16Vξ
(B2)
We consider a non-deterministic amplification opera-
tor of a fixed intensity gain g that acts upon Fock states
according to g
nˆ
2 |n〉 = g n2 |n〉. For compactness we will
suppress all kets except for Bob’s mode where the NLA
is to be applied. Applying the NLA to our state we in-
sert a number state resolution of the identity, apply the
NLA and then transform back to the quadrature basis
via another resolution of the identity,
|ABE〉 =
∫
dx ψ(x)g
nˆ
2 |x〉
=
∫
dx ψ(x)
∞∑
n=0
g
nˆ
2 |n〉 〈n|x〉
=
∫
dx ψ(x)
∞∑
n=0
g
n
2 |n〉 〈n|x〉
=
∫
dxdy ψ(x)
∞∑
n=0
g
n
2 〈n|x〉〈y|n〉√gn |y〉(B3)
For the summand we use the definition of a correctly nor-
malised overlap between a number state and a quadrature
state,
〈x|n〉 =
e−
x2
4 Hn
(
x√
2
)
(2pi)
1
4
√
2nn!
where Hn(x) = (−1)nex2 dndxn e−x
2
are the Hermite poly-
nomials, to arrive at,
∞∑
n=0
〈n|x〉〈y|n〉√gn =
∞∑
n=0
e−
x2
4 − y
2
4 Hn
(
x√
2
)
Hn
(
y√
2
)√
gn
√
2pi2nn!
Finally we make use of the following identity,
∞∑
n=0
Hn(x)Hn(y)
n!
(u
2
)n
=
1√
1− u2 e
(
2uxy
u+1 − u
2
u2−1 (x−y)
2
)
(B4)
Substituting Eq.(B4) into Eq.(B3) and then Eq.(B1) al-
lows us to compute the elements of Alice and Bob’s new
covariance matrix via lengthy but straightforward inte-
gration. The expressions for the elements themselves are
cumbersome but the resultant expressions can be solved
to give effective parameters that characterise an effec-
tive EPR sent through an effective channel. To facilitate
easy comparison with the previous work [11, 12] we will
rewrite the effective modulation variance as an effective
EPR entanglement parameter related by χ =
√
VA
VA+2
.
7These effective parameters are given by,
χNLA =
√
1 +
2T (1− g))
gTξ − Tξ − 2)χ
TNLA =
4gT
(−2 + (−1 + g)T (−2 + ξ))(−2 + (−1 + g)Tξ)
ξNLA = ξ − ξT (ξ − 2)(g − 1)/2 (B5)
An important sanity check is that in the limit g → 1
these expressions simply return the input values and for
ξ = 0 correspond to the results of [11, 12]. These results
have been independently derived in [15] by a different
method, namely considering the action of the NLA on
the thermal state that is Bob’s output.
Appendix C: Calculation of Key rate
Now we have all the tools necessary to derive the key
rate for the case of a noisy Gaussian channel utilising
Gaussian post-selection. This is given by the difference
in the mutual information between the two legitimate
parties, and the reference party and the eavesdropper.
First we need to calculate the covariance matrix of the
post-selected ensemble.
We recall that in the EB scheme if Alice were to make
a heterodyne measurement of xA, pA upon her arm of the
EPR she would find a Gaussian distribution distribution
with variance V = VA+22 and would project Bob’s arm
into a coherent state centered at
√
VA
2+VA
(xA, pA). After
transmission Bob’s receives displaced thermal states of
variance VB = TVA + Tξ + 1. Writing P (xA, xB) =
P (xA)P (xB |xA) we have for the conditional probability
distribution,
P (xA, xB) =
e
− x
2
A
2+VA
−
(
−
√
TVA
2+VA
xA+xB
)
2
2(1+Tξ)
√
2pi
√
1 + Tξ
√
2 + VA
(C1)
As explained earlier Bob then applies a weighting func-
tion given by
W (x) = N
(
1 +
(
w(x)
w(∆)
− 1
)
(Θ(x+ ∆)−Θ(x−∆))
)
(C2)
where w(x) =
√
VB/VPS exp(−x2(1/VPS−1/VB)), Θ(x)
is the Heaviside step function, ∆ is a cutoff point and
N is the renormalisation. Thus the post-selected joint
probability distribution is given by,
PPS(xA, xB) = P (xA, xB)W (xB) (C3)
The fraction of data kept is the re-normalisation N−1 =∫
dxAdxBP (xA, xB)W (xB). For the post-selected co-
variance matrix the necessary moments, M (xA, xB) =
x2A, xAxB etc., are found by evaluating the integral
〈M(xA, xB)〉 =
∫
dxAdxB PPS(xA, xB)M (xA, xB)(C4)
1. Alice and Bob Mutual Information
The maximum information Alice and Bob can extract
from two correlated variables with joint probability dis-
tribution P (xA, xB) is given by Shannon’s formula,
I(a : b) = P (xA, xB) log
(
P (xA, xB)
P (xA)P (xB)
)
(C5)
where P (xA), P (xB) are the marginal probability distri-
butions and is the same for reverse and direct reconcilia-
tion. In the case of Gaussian distributions this would re-
duce to the familiar formula IG(a : b) =
1
2 log(1 +SNR).
As outlined in the paper for a target variance VPS > VB
there will be some values of ∆ for which our distribu-
tions will diverge from Gaussian but this non-Gaussianity
turns out to be very small. Finding efficient reconcilia-
tion codes to extract the maximum information is non-
trivial but as the distributions that result from this proto-
col are extremely close to Gaussian the recent promising
advances in the reconciliation of Gaussian variables [17]
should find application in this protocol. Alternatively
Alice and Bob could also engage in a discretisation as
outlined in [4].
2. Eve Mutual Information
We will be bounding Eve’s information by calculat-
ing it for a Gaussian state with the measured CM. The
Gaussian entropies can be calculated using,
S(ρ) =
∑
k
(1 + λk) log(1 + λk)− λk log(λk)
where λk are the symplectic eigenvalues of γρ the covari-
ance matrix of ρ. These can be calculated in for example,
[10] or in full generality [21].
a. Direct Reconciliation
Eve’s quantum information about Alice’s data is given
by,
I(xA : E) = S(ρ
PS
E )− S(ρPSE |xA) (C6)
Given that Eve purifies the state ρPSE = ρ
PS
AB . The co-
variance matrix of ρPSAB can be calculated directly from
Eq.(C4) and is of the symmetric form Eq.(A1) with en-
tries
a = V PSA + 1
b = TPSV PSA + T
PSξPS + 1
c =
√
TPS((V PSA )
2 + 2V PSA )
Alice then makes a heterodyne measurement introducing
a vacuum mode C. Although Bob homodynes and thus
8the second mode is unused it is not given to Eve. Eve still
purifiest the state after measurement so S(ρPSE |xA) =
S(ρBC|xA). Utilising the symplectic beamsplitter trans-
formation in Eq.(A4) we find the covariance matrix is,
γBC|xA =

b− c2a 0
√
2c
a+1 0
0 b 0 − c√
2√
2c
a+1 0
2a
a+1 0
0 − c√
2
0 a+12
 (C7)
b. Reverse Reconciliation
Eve’s quantum information about Bob’s data is given
by,
I(xA : E) = S(ρ
E
AB)− S(ρPSE |xB) (C8)
The first term is exactly the same as the direct recon-
ciliation expression but the last is more complicated due
to the additional operations in Bob’s station. Bob has
3 ancilla modes: a vacuum, mode D, for the two-mode
squeezing interaction and an EPR of variance NB , modes
G and F . Before the measurement the full CM would be
γABDFG =

a I2 c σz Z Z Z
c σz b I2 Z Z Z
Z Z I2 Z Z
Z Z Z NB I2
√
N2B − 1 σz
Z Z Z
√
N2B − 1 σz NB I2

where is a 2× 2 matrix of zeros. The states interact via
Eq.(A3) and after Bob’s measurement Eve still has the
purification so S(ρPSE |xB) = S(ρBDFG|xB) where the
covariance matrix is given by,
 γA σAD σAF σAGσAD γD σFD ZσAF σFD γF σFG
σAG Z σFG γG

where,
γA =
(
a+ c
2ηTB
NB(−1+TB)−(−1+η+bη)TB 0
0 a
)
γD =
(
b(−1 + η) + η + (1+b)2(−1+η)ηTBNB(−1+TB)−(−1+η+bη)TB 0
0 b(−1 + η) + η
)
γF =
(
(−1+η+bη)NB
NB+(−1+η+bη−NB)TB 0
0 −1 + η + bη + (1− (1 + b)η +NB)TB
)
γG =
(
NB − (−1+N
2
B)(−1+TB)
−NB+(1−(1+b)η+NB)TB 0
0 NB
)
σAD =
(
− c
√−1+η(NB(−1+TB)+TB)
NB+(−1+η+bη−NB)TB 0
0 c
√−1 + η
)
σAF =
 c√η(−√1− TB + (−1+η+bη−NB)√TB√−(−1+TB)TBNB+(−1+η+bη−NB)TB ) 0
0 c
√
η
√
1− TB

σAG =
(
c
√
η
√
−1+N2B
√
−(−1+TB)TB
−NB+(1−(1+b)η+NB)TB 0
0 0
)
(C9)
Finally the secret key rate must be multiplied by the
fraction of the data kept in the post-selection process so
the final key rate reads,
K = N(βI(a : b)− I(E : X)), X ∈ {a, b} (C10)
for direct and reverse reconciliation.
